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13.1 Introduction
Indian economic policy witnessed a marked shift following a balance-of-
payments crisis in 1991. Prior to this, India had a “less developed country
(LDC) style” composition of capital ﬂows, where current account deﬁcits
were ﬁnanced using oﬃcial ﬂows and debt ﬂows. As in other countries that
were liberalizing capital ﬂows in this period, the conceptual framework
underlying the reforms of the 1990s was based on experiences with volatile
debt ﬂows, views about the sustainability of debt ﬂows, and views about a
desirable composition of ﬂows.
The new approach, which has been broadly stable from 1992 till 2006,
consisted of liberalizing the current account, opening up to foreign direct
investment (FDI) for domestic and foreign ﬁrms, opening up to portfolio
ﬂows for foreigners, and restricting debt ﬂows. The currency regime was
shifted away from a ﬁxed-but-adjustable exchange rate to a “market-
determined exchange rate,” which was pegged to the U.S. dollar through
extensive trading on the currency market by the central bank.
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centers; and to Sumanta Basak for outstanding research assistance.of quantitative restrictions, operated by a substantial bureaucratic appa-
ratus. Liberalization of FDI and portfolio ﬂows was done in a gradual man-
ner, with a large number of incremental and partial changes to the large
number of rules. While some major decisions were taken in 1992, there
hasbeen a continual process, which continues even in 2006, of changing re-
strictions in small steps.
Liberalization of the current account has been highly successful. Posi-
tive technological shocks and dropping prices of international telecommu-
nications helped India obtain high growth rates of services exports. The re-
moval of quantitative restrictions, and the sharp drop in tariﬀs, served to
spur both imports and exports. Through these, gross ﬂows on the current
account rose from 25 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1992–93
to 35 percent in 2003–4.
Major changes took place on the capital account also. The policy bias
against debt ﬂows led to an outcome where net debt inﬂows stagnated at
roughly 1 percent of GDP between 1992–93 and 2003–4. Owing to the debt
aversion of the policy framework, gross debt ﬂows dropped from 13.5 per-
cent of GDP in 1992–93 to 10.6 percent in 2003–4. Oﬃcial ﬂows faded into
insigniﬁcance.
Restrictions on both equity portfolio investors and on FDI were eased
in this period. However, net FDI ﬂows into India have remained small, ei-
ther when compared to Indian GDP or when compared to global FDI
ﬂows. In contrast with the Chinese experience, relatively little FDI has
come into India in setting up factories that are parts of global production
chains. This may be associated with inﬁrmities of Indian indirect taxes and
transportation infrastructure. India is more important as a platform for
service production as a part of global production chains, where diﬃculties
of indirect taxes and transportation infrastructure are less important.
However, service production is less capital intensive and is associated with
smaller net FDI ﬂows.
Given the size of the Indian economy, and the relative lack of correlation
with the global business cycle, Indian equities have had low correlations
with global risk factors. In addition, India has fared well in creating the in-
stitutional mechanisms of a modern, liquid equity market. Through these
factors, portfolio ﬂows have predominated. India’s share in global portfo-
lio ﬂows is higher than India’s share in global FDI ﬂows, and net portfolio
ﬂows are substantial when compared to Indian GDP.
In many countries, there has been a close interplay between foreign in-
vestment and growth in trade. India has increased its share in world trade
without having substantial FDI. A partial explanation lies in the low cap-
ital intensity of export-oriented production. Another aspect is the initial
conditions, which consisted of a strong set of domestic ﬁrms. Portfolio
ﬂows have delivered capital to these domestic ﬁrms, which have gone on to
obtain growth in exports. The growth of domestic ﬁrms has been assisted
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bound FDI. Consequently, FDI inﬂows are somewhat larger than the data
for net inﬂows make them appear.
While portfolio ﬂows are sometimes considered volatile, in India’s expe-
rience, there has been no episode of a signiﬁcant retreat by foreign in-
vestors. Net FDI and net portfolio ﬂows have been fairly stable. Debt ﬂows
have been relatively volatile, reﬂecting frequent changes in capital controls
applicable to debt ﬂows, and changing currency expectations.
Through these policy initiatives, gross ﬂows on the capital account grew
from 15 percent of GDP in 1992–93 to 20 percent of GDP in 2003–4, along
with sharp changes in the composition of ﬂows. In 2003–4, gross portfolio
ﬂows amounted to as much as 7 percent of GDP.
The growth of the capital account, and the shift toward less government
control of the ﬂows, has generated increasing diﬃculties in terms of recon-
ciling currency policy and monetary policy autonomy with the increas-
ingly open capital account. Speculative views of the currency have been ex-
pressed by economic agents in many ways. For example, in this paper, we
ﬁnd that currency expectations are important in explaining the time series
dynamics of portfolio ﬂows.
The ability of economic agents to express speculative views on the cur-
rency in an increasingly open economy has generated diﬃculties in imple-
menting the currency regime that had not been experienced in preceding
decades. As an example, from late 2001 to early 2004, the demands of the
pegged exchange rate regime involved trading by the Reserve Bank of In-
dia (RBI) to prevent rupee appreciation. The private sector had expecta-
tions of a gradual INR appreciation, and thus had incentives to bring cap-
ital into India. This led to a large increase in inﬂows on both the current
account and the capital account. In order to uphold the pegged exchange
rate, the RBI traded extensively on the currency market, with a sharp rise
in reserves from $40 billion to $115 billion from 2001 to 2004. In 2003–4,
net capital inﬂows of $21 billion were accompanied by addition to reserves
of $31 billion. This constituted a net outward ﬂow of capital of $10.6 bil-
lion.
In retrospect, India’s approach of gradual liberalization of the capital
account has worked well in many ways. India has reaped microeconomic
beneﬁts of an open current account, and from FDI and portfolio ﬂows. In-
dia has encountered no balance-of-payments crisis in the post-1992 pe-
riod. From the macroeconomic standpoint, there have been episodes
where monetary policy autonomy was signiﬁcantly attenuated in the im-
plementation of the currency regime. One key element of India’s original
policy quest—the search for a sustainable framework for augmenting in-
vestment through current account deﬁcits—has as yet not been achieved.
In this paper, we explore the causes and consequences of the major em-
pirical features of India’s experience with capital ﬂows. The paper begins
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and broad empirical features (section 13.3). We review the evolution of the
currency regime (section 13.4) and capital controls (section 13.5). We ex-
amine FDI and portfolio ﬂows in section 13.6, where we also explore the
interplay between currency expectations and portfolio ﬂows. Section 13.7
examines India’s experience from the viewpoint of the impossible trinity of
open economy macroeconomics, with an accent on the events of 2003–4.
Finally, section 13.8 concludes.
13.2 The Quest for a Sustainable Current Account Deﬁcit
India had low savings rates in the early period, with values of 9.8 percent
in the 1950s, 12.5 percent in the 1960s, and 17.2 percent in the 1970s. Eco-
nomic policy thinking was very aware of the opportunity to use current ac-
count deﬁcits, and net capital inﬂows, in order to supplement domestic
savings, augment investment, and thus enjoy a faster growth trajectory.
However, India persistently encountered diﬃculties in obtaining a sus-
tained and economically signiﬁcant current account deﬁcit. In the late
1970s, a combination of high domestic inﬂation, a world oil price hike, and
a pegged exchange rate generated low exports, a large current account
deﬁcit, and near exhaustion of reserves. In response to this, India under-
took an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program in 1981. Condi-
tionalities associated with this program included a revision of the exchange
rate (Joshi and Little 1994).
By the late 1980s, India had built up a signiﬁcant stock of external debt.
In a period of political instability in 1990, there was a crisis of conﬁdence,
which gave a ﬂight of debt and conditions of a speculative attack on the
pegged exchange rate. In response to this, India undertook an IMF pro-
gram in 1991. Conditionalities associated with this program included revi-
sion of the exchange rate and a shift to a market-determined exchange rate.
In recent years, several prominent documents in policy analysis have ad-
vocated larger but sustainable current account deﬁcits. The expert group
on commercialisation of infrastructure projects, chaired by Rakesh Mo-
han (1996, p. 49) states that
The sustainability of such economic growth would require continuing
high growth in exports, perhaps declining from the current 20 per cent
annual growth to about 10 per cent by the end of the next decade, giving
an average of about 15 per cent annual growth over the period. If this
takes place, total exports should reach about $66 billion in 2000–01 and
$115 billion by 2005–06. At these levels, exports would comprise about
15 per cent of GDP in 2000–01 and 17 per cent of GDP by 2005–06, up
from the current levels of about 10 per cent. If exports manage to in-
crease to these levels, it would become feasible for India to sustain a
wider current account deﬁcit which is required for the non-inﬂationary
612 Ajay Shah and Ila Patnaikabsorption of external capital inﬂows. It is suggested that a sustainable
level of current account deﬁcit would increase from the current level of
1.5 per cent of GDP to 2.5 per cent in 2000–01 and 3 per cent in 2005–
06. It would then be possible for the net capital inﬂow to rise from the
current level of about $7 billion to $8 billion to about $17 billion to $20
billion by 2000–01 and about $25 billion to $30 billion by 2005–06.
As table 13.1 shows, India did better than anticipated. Total exports
reached $118 billion, or 18.4 percent of GDP in 2003–4, and net capital in-
ﬂows reached $20.5 billion. However, far from obtaining a larger current
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Table 13.1 Indian capital ﬂows: 1992–93 versus 2003–4
Percent to GDP
1992–93 2003–4  Growth 
(in US$ billions) (in US$ billions) percent 1992–93 2003–4
GDP at market prices 239.09 639.90 9.36
Current account (net) –3.53 10.56 –1.47 1.65
Merchandise
Outﬂows 24.32 80.18 11.46 10.17 12.53
Inﬂows 18.87 64.72 11.86 7.89 10.11
Invisibles
Outﬂows 7.41 26.97 12.46 3.10 4.21
Inﬂows 9.33 52.98 17.10 3.90 8.28
Capital account (net) 3.88 20.54 16.37 1.62 3.21
Oﬃcial ﬂows
Outﬂows 2.66 6.46 8.40 1.11 1.01
Inﬂows 4.92 3.34 –3.47 2.06 0.52
FDI
Outﬂows 0.03 1.47 42.42 0.01 0.23
Inﬂows 0.34 4.89 27.25 0.14 0.76
Portfolio equity
Outﬂows 0.00 16.86 127.46 0.00 2.64
Inﬂows 0.24 28.22 54.01 0.10 4.41
Debt
Outﬂows 14.99 31.01 6.83 6.27 4.85
Inﬂows 17.37 37.14 7.15 7.26 5.80
Miscellaneous
Outﬂows 2.34 2.27 –0.27 0.98 0.35
Inﬂows 1.36 5.35 13.26 0.57 0.84
Reserves at year end 6.43 107.45 29.17 2.69 16.79
Addition to reserves 0.70 31.42 41.35 0.29 4.91
Metric of integration 96.60 352.05 12.47 40.40 55.02
Trade integration 59.93 224.85 12.77 25.07 35.14
Financial integration 36.67 127.20 11.97 15.34 19.88
Notes: “Oﬃcial ﬂows” comprise external assistance, rupee debt service with respect to Rus-
sia, and IMF-related monetary movements. “Debt” comprises commercial borrowing, short-
term loans, and banking capital. “Miscellaneous” is the sum of “Other capital ﬂows” and er-
rors and omissions. The Indian ﬁscal year runs from April to March, so 2003–4 runs from
April 1, 2003, to March 31, 2004.account deﬁcit, as had been envisaged in this prominent and inﬂuential re-
port, India ended up with a current account surplus of 1.7 percent of GDP
in 2003–4.
The 10th plan document, which is a medium-term economic policy anal-
ysis eﬀort, expresses regrets at the inadequate levels of the current account
deﬁcit in recent years (volume 1, paragraph 4.18): “The current account
deﬁcit narrowed down and on the average was 0.8 per cent of GDP, less
than one half of the 2.1 per cent envisaged in the plan.”
There has been considerable discussion about a development strategy
where countries might desire current account surpluses (Dooley, Folkerts-
Landau, and Garber 2003). In India’s case, public statements on develop-
ment policy were in favor of current account deﬁcits. Many economists ar-
gued that the current account surplus in 2003–4, of 1.7 percent of GDP,
implied a signiﬁcant opportunity cost in terms of investment forgone and
thus lower GDP growth (Lal, Bery, and Pant 2003).
13.3 Broad Empirical Features
Broad facts about Indian capital ﬂows are presented in table 13.1, which
shows two years: 1992–93 and 2003–4. The year 1992–93 was chosen since
it reﬂects the last year of “the previous regime” of highly restricted capital
ﬂows.1 The year 2003–4 is the most recent year observed.
GDP: Over this eleven-year period, GDP measured in current dollars
grew by an average of 9.4 percent per annum.
Current account: India undertook major initiatives in trade liberaliza-
tion in this period (Panagariya 2005). This led to growth rates of roughly
12 percent per annum in imports and exports of merchandise, and imports
of invisibles. The dropping prices of global telecommunications led to an
increase in service exports from India, giving a higher invisibles export
growth rate of 17 percent per annum. Putting these together, trade inte-
gration (measured as gross current account ﬂows as percent to GDP) rose
sharply from 25.1 percent of GDP in 1992–93 to 35.1 percent of GDP in
2003–4: an increase of 10 percentage points in eleven years. In addition,
over this period, the current account switched from a deﬁcit of 1.5 percent
of GDP to a surplus of 1.7 percent of GDP.
Net capital ﬂows: On the surface, net capital ﬂows appear to have
changed little, from 1.6 percent of GDP in 1992–93 to 3.2 percent of GDP
614 Ajay Shah and Ila Patnaik
1. Signiﬁcant capital ﬂows through FDI and portfolio investment commenced in 1993–94,
which justiﬁes the choice of 1992–93 as the last year of the previous policy regime.
The year-end exchange rate used for 1992–93 incorporates the sharp devaluation that took
place when the rupee became a market-determined exchange rate in 1992. Hence, 1992–93 is
also the ﬁrst year for which it is meaningful to convert between rupees and dollars (e.g., for
the purposes of reexpressing British pounds in U.S. dollars). All values are shown in U.S. dol-
lars to ease interpretation and international comparison, and to avoid noise induced by do-
mestic inﬂation volatility in this period.in 2003–4 (see ﬁgure 13.1). Yet major changes took place in the structure
of capital ﬂows.
Debt ﬂows: In 1992–93, which reﬂects the previous policy regime, the
capital account was dominated by oﬃcial ﬂows and debt ﬂows. Over this
eleven-year period, net oﬃcial ﬂows switched from  0.9 percent of GDP
to –0.5 percent, and net debt ﬂows stagnated at 1 percent of GDP. Given
the limited accretion of debt, and high export growth, the debt service ra-
tio dropped from 27.5 percent in 1992–93 to 18.1 percent in 2003–4.
FDI and portfolio investment: Major growth was seen in FDI and port-
folio investment. Gross ﬂows in these two channels grew sharply from 0.3
percent of GDP to 8 percent of GDP. The average annual growth rate of
net FDI ﬂows was 24.2 percent, and that for net portfolio ﬂows was 41.9
percent. Through these high growth rates, over this period, India switched
from LDC-style capital ﬂows, emphasizing oﬃcial ﬂows and debt, to an
“emerging market style” structure of capital ﬂows, emphasizing FDI and
portfolio investment. Gross ﬂows on the capital account reached 19.9 per-
cent of GDP in 2003–4, an increase of 4.5 percentage points as compared
with 1992–93.
Portfolio ﬂows are more prominent when measuring gross ﬂows on the
capital account, since they involve larger two-way ﬂows of capital. In
2003–4, FDI inﬂows were 3.33 times bigger than FDI outﬂows, but port-
folio inﬂows were only 1.67 times bigger than portfolio outﬂows. Hence,
even though net ﬂows through portfolio investment were 3.3 times larger
than net FDI ﬂows in 2003–4, gross portfolio ﬂows in 2003–4 amounted to
7 percent of GDP, while gross FDI ﬂows amounted to only 1 percent of
GDP.
Outward ﬂows: These changes were accompanied by a substantial out-
ward ﬂow of capital through purchases of foreign exchange reserves. The
year-end reserves rose sharply from 2.7 percent of GDP in 1992–93 to 16.8
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Fig. 13.1 Net capital ﬂows (US$ billions per quarter)percent of GDP in 2003–4. In 2003–4 alone, the addition to reserves was
4.9 percent of GDP. In this year, net capital inﬂows of $20.5 billion and a
current account surplus of $10.6 billion were associated with an addition
to reserves of $31.4 billion.
Global integration: The sum of gross ﬂows on the current and capital ac-
count serves as an overall metric of integration into the world economy.
This rose by 14.6 percentage points over this eleven-year period, from 40.4
percent in 1992–93 to 55 percent in 2003–4.
These data and this description suggest that the two major features of
India’s experience with capital ﬂows have been
• Rapid growth of foreign investment—particularly portfolio invest-
ment—accompanied by slow growth of debt ﬂows.
• A substantial extent of outward ﬂows through reserve accumula-
tion.
This paper seeks to shed some light on the causes and consequences of
these major features.
13.4 Currency Regime
In India, there has been a rich interplay between policies and outcomes
on capital ﬂows and the currency regime. According to the RBI, the Indian
rupee is a market-determined exchange rate, in the sense that there is a cur-
rency market and the exchange rate is not administratively determined. In-
dia has clearly moved away from ﬁxed exchange rates. However, the RBI
actively trades on the market, with the goal of containing volatility and in-
ﬂuencing the market price.
In India, as in most developing countries, there has been a distinction
between the de facto and the de jure currency regime. Patnaik (2003) ar-
gues that there is a de facto pegged exchange rate, for the following rea-
sons:
• There is extremely low volatility of the rupee-dollar exchange rate
alongside high volatilities of other exchange rates such as the rupee-
euro and rupee-yen. Table 13.2 shows that the volatility of daily re-
turns on the rupee-dollar has been 0.277 percent, while the volatility
of (say) the rupee-yen has been 0.848 percent per day. The latter value
is remarkably close to the dollar-yen volatility of 0.836 percent per
day. In the polar case where the rupee-dollar were a ﬁxed exchange, the
rupee-yen volatility would be exactly equal to the dollar-yen volatility.
Volatilities of the rupee against the British pound, euro, and yen take
on large values, similar to those of ﬂoating exchange rates such as the
dollar-euro or the euro-pound.
• Tests based on Frankel and Wei (1994) show that the U.S. dollar is
overwhelmingly the dominant currency in explaining ﬂuctuations of
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franc returns is 0.9345, which is near 1, while other coeﬃcients are
near 0. The R2 of this regression is 87.45 percent.
• India’s enormous reserve buildup after mid-2002 cannot be explained
by a quest for reserves as insurance.
• Extending the Calvo and Reinhart (2002)   metric of currency ﬂexi-
bility beyond 1999 shows that there has been no change in this metric
over 1979–2003.
The extent of pegging has varied through this period. There have been
multimonth periods where the rupee-dollar exchange rate was ﬁxed, but
there have also been periods where the volatility of the rupee-dollar ex-
change rate was closer to that of the rupee-euro or the rupee-yen. The facts
shown above represent the average behavior over the period from August
1992 to November 2004.
As is typical with pegged exchange rates, the nominal rupee-dollar ex-
change rate has had low volatility, while all other measures of the exchange
rate have been more volatile. As an example, there has been signiﬁcant
volatility of the real eﬀective exchange rate (REER; ﬁgure 13.2). A sub-
stantial appreciation of the REER took place through a pegged rupee-
dollar exchange rate coupled with higher domestic inﬂation.
13.5 Capital Controls
13.5.1 Evolution of Capital Controls
Foreign institutional investors (FIIs) were given permission to partici-
pate on the Indian market on September 14, 1992. Limits were put in place
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Table 13.2 Cross-currency volatility (daily returns, August 1992 to November 2004)
U.S. dollar British pound Euro Yen
Rupee 0.277 0.634 0.778 0.848
U.S. dollar 0.588 0.738 0.836
British pound 0.601 0.896
Euro 0.932
2. Frankel and Wei (1994) developed a regression-based approach for testing for pegging.
In this approach, an independent currency, such as the Swiss franc, is chosen as a numeraire.
The model estimated is
d log      1    2d log      3d log      4d log     ε.
This regression picks up the extent to which the rupee-franc rate ﬂuctuates in response to
ﬂuctuations in the dollar-franc rate. If there is pegging to the dollar, then ﬂuctuations in the
yen and deutsche mark will be irrelevant, and we will observe  3   4 0 while  2 1. If there
is no pegging, then all the three coeﬃcients will be diﬀerent from 0. The R2 of this regression












francto ensure that no one FII could own more than 5 percent of a company and
all FIIs (put together) could not own more than 24 percent of a company.
From 1992 onward, restrictions on portfolio equity investment have
been steadily eased, while sharp constraints on bond investment have been
preserved. Table 13.4 shows the major events of the 1992–2004 period in
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Table 13.3 Frankel-Wei regression (daily returns, August 1992 to November 2004)
Parameter Coeﬃcient
d log   0.9345
(72.73)
d log   0.0519
(6.47)
d log   –0.0134
(–0.7)








Notes: USD   U.S. dollar; CHF   Swiss franc; JPY   Japanese yen; EUR   euro; GBP  













Fig. 13.2 Thirty-six-country trade weighted REERTable 13.4 Chronology of easing controls on portfolio ﬂows
September 14, 1992 Foreign institutional investors (FIIs) permitted into the country:
these included pension funds, mutual funds, endowments, etc.,
proposing to invest in India as broad-based funds with at least 50
investors and no investor with more than 5 percent. Permitted access
to primary and secondary market for securities, and products sold by
mutual funds, with a minimum 70 percent investment in equities.
Ceiling upon one FII of 5 percent ownership of any ﬁrm, and ceiling
upon total of all FIIs at 24 percent.
November 1996 New concept of “100 percent debt FIIs” permitted, which could
invest in corporate bonds but not government bonds.
April 4, 1997 Ceiling upon total ownership by all FIIs of local ﬁrms raised from 24
percent to 30 percent (required shareholder resolution).
April 1998 FIIs permitted to invest in government bonds, subject to a ceiling
upon all FIIs put together of $1 billion.
June 11, 1998 Ceiling upon ownership by one FII in one ﬁrm raised from 5 percent
to 10 percent. FIIs permitted to partially hedge currency exposure
using the currency forward market. FIIs permitted to trade on the
equity derivatives market in a limited way.
August 1999 Requirement that FII must have at least 50 investors eased to 20
investors.
February 2000 Foreign ﬁrms and individuals permitted access to the Indian market
through FIIs as “subaccounts.” Local fund managers also permitted
to do fund management for foreign ﬁrms and individuals through
subaccounts. Requirement that no investor can have over 5 percent of
the FII fund eased to 10 percent.
March 1, 2000 Ceiling upon total ownership by all FIIs of local ﬁrms raised from 30
percent to 40 percent (required shareholder resolution).
March 8, 2001 Ceiling upon total ownership by all FIIs of local ﬁrms raised from 40
percent to 49 percent (required shareholder resolution).
September 20, 2001 Ceiling upon total ownership by all FIIs of local ﬁrms raised from 49
percent to “the sectoral cap for the industry” (required shareholder
resolution).
January 8, 2003 Limitations upon FIIs hedging using the currency forward market
removed.
December 2003 Twin approvals for FIIs at both SEBI and RBI replaced by single
approval at SEBI.
November 2004 New ceiling placed upon ownership of all FIIs of all corporate bonds
of $0.5 billion.
February 2006 The ceiling upon ownership of all FIIs of government bonds raised to
$2 billion and ceiling upon ownership of all FIIs of corporate bonds
raised to $1.5 billion.the easing of capital controls on portfolio ﬂows. It also gives a sense of the
detailed system of quantitative restrictions operated by the RBI and the in-
tricate steps through which reform has come about. Through this reform
process, portfolio investors are now able to trade in the spot and derivative
markets for both equities and currency. However, the changes in rules have
not always been only in the direction of liberalization—sometimes reforms
have been reversed.
Under the Indian policy framework, entities eligible to become FIIs
have an essentially open capital account, while being required to suﬀer
overhead costs of registration and reporting in India. There are two
kinds of entities that do not trade in the Indian market through the FII
framework: those that are ineligible and those that ﬁnd the overhead
costs unacceptable. In order to overcome these constraints, an over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives market has sprung up for access products
called participatory notes. In this market, eligible FIIs sell call options
or linear exposures to others. In early 2006, roughly half of the out-
standing FII investments into India had come through access products
sold by 17 out of the 733 registered FIIs. The rise of access products un-
derlines the extent to which India’s FII framework implies that there is
de facto capital account convertibility when it comes to equity invest-
ment.
While considerable openness on FDI exists, there are restrictions on for-
eign ownership in certain industries. For example, the foreign company en-
gaging in FDI in insurance is limited to 26 percent ownership. Another ma-
jor constraint inﬂuencing FDI is “Press Note 18,” whereby a foreign ﬁrm
that wishes to start a second project in India is required to take approval of
its ﬁrst domestic partner.
In recent years, some databases have sought to distill the system of cap-
ital controls prevalent in a country at a point in time into a simple score
(Johnston and Tamirisa 1998). It is instructive to examine their values for
India. The IMF single-dummy indexes have India as 1 from 1983 to 1995,a
period over which major changes took place. Miniane (2004) reports a com-
posite measure based on fourteen disaggregated indexes and ﬁnds that In-
dia moved from 0.917 in 1983 to 0.923 in 2000 (an increase in capital con-
trols). The level and the change in both these indexes appear inconsistent
with India’s experience, where substantial openness has come about
through a large number of small steps.
13.5.2 Restrictions on CIP Arbitrage
One element of the capital controls consists of barriers to arbitrage on
the currency forward market. In an ordinary forward market, arbitrage
and only arbitrage deﬁnes the forward rate. Even if there are strong specu-
lative views and positions on the market, there is relatively little that can be
inferred from forward premium, since this is primarily determined by cov-
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near-inﬁnite capital should come into play in arbitrage. Through this pro-
cess, arbitrageurs restore market eﬃciency and push the forward price
back to fair value.
In India, banking regulations place sharp restrictions upon the ability of
banks to engage in CIP arbitrage. Importers and exporters are permitted
access to the forward market, where they are free to either hedge or not
hedge. The supply and demand for forward dollars by these “permitted
hedgers” determines the forward price, and banks are prevented from en-
gaging in CIP arbitrage. This serves to break the link between the spot and
the derivative.4 In addition, the empirical experience with the RBI’s trad-
ing shows that while the RBI trades extensively on the spot market, the ob-
served forward price tends to be a market-determined rate that is not dis-
torted through trading by the central bank.
As shown in ﬁgure 13.3, in the rupee-dollar forward market, deviations
from the covered parity condition have tended to persist over multimonth
periods. In an unrestricted market, arbitrage would have wiped out such
deviations almost instantly. However, the restrictions against CIP arbi-
trage that are in force have prevented arbitrage from restoring market eﬃ-
ciency.
This situation—where restrictions on CIP arbitrage are coupled with a
largely undistorted forward market—has generated a remarkable informa-
tion source as a side eﬀect. If economic agents expect the rupee to depreci-
ate, there would be a greater interest in selling rupees forward—exporters
would stay unhedged, and importers would be likely to hedge. Conversely,
if economic agents expect the rupee to appreciate, there would be greater
interest in buying rupees forward while those expecting to import would
stay unhedged. Lacking adequate arbitrage capital, the forward price does
not get restored to the fair value. The deviation between the fair value of
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3. The arithmetic of forward pricing in an eﬃcient market is based on “covered interest par-
ity.” Covered interest parity involves comparing two routes for riskless dollar investment. An
investor could convert $1 into (1   r u)T through r u, which is obtained from the U.S. zero
coupon yield curve for T years. Alternatively, the investor could convert into rupees at the
spot price S, invest in the government of India zero coupon yield curve, and obtain a locked-
in cash ﬂow of S(1   r i)T/F by converting back into dollars at the rate F at date T. Under no-
arbitrage, these two investment strategies have to yield an identical return, through which the
fair value for F can be computed.
4. Currency derivatives can trade either OTC or on exchanges. In India, trading of currency
derivatives on exchange is infeasible owing to legal diﬃculties. Hence, our treatment is lim-
ited to currency forwards and does not utilize data from a currency futures market.
Oﬀshore cash-settled forward markets, named “nondeliverable forward (NDF) markets,”
exist on the Indian rupee. However, the mere existence of a currency forward market outside
the reach of domestic currency controls is not enough to generate informative prices in the
sense of a forward market that is immune to CIP. The essential and unique feature of India’s
forward market is the restrictions upon CIP arbitrage. If (for example) a forward market ex-
isted outside the country, but if arbitrage were feasible, then it would also obey CIP and the
prices observed there would be noninformative.the forward premium and the observed value on the market then serves as
a measure of the speculative views in the market about the future course of
the currency.5 As ﬁgure 13.3 shows, in the period from 1997 to 2000, the
CIP deviation was generally negative, which suggests that rupee deprecia-
tion was expected. In 2003, the CIP deviation changed sign, which sug-
gested expectations of rupee appreciation.
If arbitrage was unrestricted, the forward premium would not have such
an interpretation and would be relatively noninformative. Under the ex-
isting policy framework, the CIP deviation is a uniquely useful high-
frequency market-based measure of future expectations, one that is not
available in most countries where regulators do not inhibit arbitrage.6
Given the nature of rules governing importers and exporters, there is
little doubt that CIP deviations in India reﬂect the views of economic
agents who are given the choice between hedging and not hedging. How-
ever, the extent of correctness of these views is a distinct question. An im-
portant question concerns the extent to which the speculative views of the
market predict future exchange rate movements.
Two speciﬁc episodes can be isolated in which the views of the market
proved to be wrong. In 1993 and 1994, with strong portfolio inﬂows, the
CIP deviation was strong and positive, suggesting that private agents ex-
pected a currency appreciation. However, the RBI chose to eﬀectively have
a ﬁxed exchange rate of 31.37 rupees (Rs), and the expectations of agents
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5. Apart from conveying expectations of the market, the deviation between the observed
forward premium and its fair value also shows the arbitrage opportunity available to the few
economic agents who are permitted to engage in the trading required for doing CIP arbitrage.
Their mass has thus far not been large enough to remove CIP deviations.
6. Internationally, empirical research related to currency expectations uses data based on sur-
veys (Frankel and Okongwu 1996). Market participants, central bankers, multinational com-
panies, and economics departments of banks are interviewed on a weekly or monthly basis. Sur-
vey data such as the Currency Forecasters’ Digest, now known as the Financial Times Currency
Forecast, forms the basis for a number of papers in the ﬁeld (Chinn and Frankel 1994).
Fig. 13.3 Deviation between actual and fair trade value of rupee-dollar 
forward premiumproved to be wrong. In late 1997 and early 1998, in the aftermath of the
East Asian crisis, there were strong expectations that the rupee would de-
value sharply, giving very large negative values of the CIP deviation (see ﬁg-
ure 13.3). In the event, domestic interest rates were raised sharply in an “in-
terest rate defense,” and the rupee did not devalue, so the expectations of
agents proved to be wrong (Patnaik 2005).
We can test the extent to which lagged CIP deviations explain current
changes of the exchange rate. If market expectations are (on average) cor-
rect, when past values of the CIP deviation are positive, this should be as-
sociated with currency appreciation (negative slopes).
A diﬃculty faced in this regression is the distribution of the CIP devia-
tion (ﬁgure 13.4), where there are some extreme values (from late 1997 and
early 1998). These extreme values for the CIP deviation prove to be inﬂu-
ential observations in a regression. Hence, in addition to showing ordinary
least squares (OLS) results, we investigate this question using a robust re-
gression using an M-estimator (Venables and Ripley 2002).
The results for weekly data (table 13.5) and monthly data (table 13.6)
suggest that the CIP deviation at a given point in time is a statistically sig-
niﬁcant predictor of future currency returns over a considerable future
time period.7
The picture that the rupee spot and forward markets represent may
hence be summarized as the following elements:
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Fig. 13.4 Kernel density plot of CIP deviation
7. These regressions are based on a daily time series from January 1, 1997, to February 4,
2005. The last observed value for the week or the month is used in converting to weekly or
monthly frequencies. The simplest model (currency returns on lagged CIP deviation) juxta-
poses the currency returns of this month with the CIP deviation prevalent at the end of the
last month.1. The rupee-dollar spot market is a pegged exchange rate. It is not a
ﬂoating rate. It is not a random walk. Violations of market eﬃciency are
detected. It may hence be possible for economic agents to form useful pre-
dictions of future currency movements.
2. There are strong restrictions that inhibit CIP arbitrage.
3. Hence, sustained CIP deviations are found.
4. In the absence of adequate arbitrage capital, the CIP deviation re-
ﬂects the speculative views of economic agents who choose to hedge or not
hedge depending on expectations about future exchange rate ﬂuctuations.
5. CIP deviations do have some forecasting power in predicting future
exchange rate ﬂuctuations.
13.5.3 Capital Controls Prevalent in 2005
The state of capital controls in 2005 may be summarized as follows:8
Current account: There are no current account restrictions, other than
the limit upon individuals of purchasing no more than $10,000 per year for
the purpose of foreign travel.
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Table 13.5 CIP deviation as predictor of future currency returns (weekly data)
OLS OLS Robust LS Robust LS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CIP deviation lag 1 –0.025 0.009 –0.023 –0.010
(–2.83) (0.36) (–5.21) (–0.78)
Lag 2 –0.028 –0.014
(–0.84) (–0.82)
Lag 3 –0.009 0.001
(–0.36) (0.05)
R2 0.019 0.024
Notes: CIP   covered interest parity; OLS   ordinary least squares; LS   least squares.
Table 13.6 CIP deviation as predictor of future currency returns (monthly data)
OLS OLS Robust LS Robust LS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CIP deviation lag 1 –0.121 –0.130 –0.097 –0.111
(–2.42) (–1.77) (–3.43) (–2.67)
Lag 2 0.171 0.080
(1.91) (1.58)
Lag 3 –0.205 –0.099
(–2.78) (–2.36)
R2 0.058 0.134
8. The discussant of the paper, Takatoshi Ito, remarked that these capital controls were
reminiscent of Japan in the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s (Ito 1983).Restrictions upon the currency market: Market access to the currency
market is severely restricted, primarily to banks. Only economic agents
with a direct current account or capital account exposure are permitted to
trade in the market. Exchange traded currency derivatives are absent. Im-
porters and exporters face binding restrictions on the size of their currency
forward positions.
Outward ﬂows by individuals: Individuals are limited to taking $25,000
per year out of the country.
Outward ﬂows by ﬁrms: Firms are limited to taking capital out of the
country that is equal to their net worth.
Borrowing by ﬁrms:External borrowing by ﬁrms must be of at least three
years’ maturity below $20 million and of at least ﬁve years’ maturity be-
yond. Borrowing up to $500 million by a ﬁrm “for certain speciﬁed end-
users” (e.g., expanding a factory, importing capital goods) is allowed with-
out requiring permissions. There is a ceiling whereby approvals for
borrowing by all ﬁrms (put together), in a year, should not exceed $9 bil-
lion per year. This limit, of $9 billion, is revised upward roughly every one
to two years.
Firms are “required to hedge their currency exposure,” but there is no
mechanism for verifying this, and substantial restrictions on their activities
on the currency forward market are in place.
Borrowing by banks: The central bank controls the interest rate at which
banks borrow from foreigners through “nonresident deposits.”9
Generic restrictions upon portfolio ﬂows: Only FIIs are permitted to in-
vest in the country.
Debt investment by foreign portfolio investors: The aggregate investment
in government bonds by all foreign investors cannot exceed $2 billion. The
aggregate bond investments by any one fund cannot exceed 30 percent.
The total corporate bond ownership by all foreign investors cannot exceed
$1.5 billion.
Equity investments by foreign portfolio investors: The aggregate foreign
holding in a company is subject to a limit that can be set by the sharehold-
ers of the company. This limit is, in turn, subject to “sectoral limits” that
apply in certain sectors. No one foreign portfolio investor can own more
than 10 percent of a company. Foreign ownership in certain sectors (tele-
communications, insurance, banking) is capped at various levels. Firms
are free to issue global depository receipts (GDRs) or American deposi-
tory receipts (ADRs) outside the country, which can be sold to a broad
swathe of global investors. Within these restrictions, foreign investors are
fully able to convert currency, hedge currency risk, and trade in the equity
spot or derivatives markets.
FDI:Foreign ownership in certain sectors (e.g., telecommunications, in-
surance, banking) is capped at various levels (table 13.7). Foreign compa-
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9. Gordon and Gupta (2004) analyze the determinants of nonresident deposits.nies require approval of the ﬁrst ﬁrm they choose to do a joint venture with
in the country, if they wish to start a related business.
13.6 Investment Flows
13.6.1 FDI
Figure 13.5 shows the time series of quarterly ﬂows of FDI. In order to
aid comparability, it has the same scale as ﬁgures 13.1 and (in section
13.6.2) 13.6.
In many countries, high exports growth has been strongly associated
with FDI. As shown in table 13.1, India has experienced annual dollar
growth rates of merchandise exports of 12 percent and services exports of
17 percent. Thus, India’s share in world trade of both goods and services
has been increasing, without high FDI. Two elements of an explanation
might be labor-intensive exports and the strength of India’s domestic ﬁrms.
Labor-Intensive Exports
This may partly reﬂect the higher extent to which FDI into India has em-
phasized labor-intensive economic activities, such as service exports. As an
example, call centers have a capital output ratio of just 0.75; hence, an an-
nual ﬂow of exports worth $10 billion requires a stock of capital of only
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Table 13.7 Ownership restrictions on FDI
Sector Limit on foreign ownership (%)
FDI prohibited
Retail, plantations, real estate 0






Oil and gas pipelines 51
Trading 51
Petroleum exploration 51 to 100
Petroleum distribution 74






All other areas 100$7.5 billion.10 Table 13.8 shows the sectoral composition of FDI, which
shows that, like the Indian exports basket, FDI has been diversiﬁed across
a broad range of sectors. The service sector—which includes export-
oriented services and domestic services—accounted for only 8.2 percent of
total FDI.
Strength of Domestic Firms
Unlike many emerging markets or transition economies, India had a
strong set of domestic ﬁrms in place by the 1990s. A steady ﬂow of startups
and initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) has fueled a large domestic corporate
sector. These domestic ﬁrms were able to engage in export-oriented activi-
ties, as opposed to the higher reliance seen in other countries upon foreign
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Fig. 13.5 Net FDI ﬂows (US$ billions per quarter)
10. The rough ﬁnancial structure of a 1,000-seat call center, as of 2004, is as follows. The
project cost is roughly $15 million, of which $10 million is ﬁxed capital (excluding real estate).
The annual revenue works out to roughly $25 million, of which the value added is roughly $20
million.
Table 13.8 Sectoral composition of FDI: August 1991 to November 2004
Sector FDI ﬂows (in US$ billions) Percent of total
Oil and electricity 2.5 9.8
Telecommunications 2.7 10.5
Transportation 2.9 11.4
Electrical, electronics, software 3.8 15.1
Metals 0.5 1.9
Chemicals 1.7 6.0
Food processing 1.1 4.2
Services 2.2 8.2
Others 15.0 32.9
Total 32.3 100.0ﬁrms who would ﬁrst bring in FDI and then export. In India’s case, the role
of foreign capital ﬂows has worked, to a greater extent, through portfolio
ﬂows into the domestic equity market, through domestic ﬁrms to exports.
Domestic ﬁrms have been given an increasingly liberal framework for
outward FDI ﬂows so that they can become multinational corporations. In
2003–4, gross FDI inﬂows of $4.89 billion were accompanied by gross out-
ﬂows of $1.47 billion. Oﬀshore investments by Indian ﬁrms made up part
of the latter. To this extent, Indian data show lower net FDI ﬂows.
Table 13.9 shows the country composition of FDI into India.11 In the
case of each of the top ﬁve countries by FDI share, the FDI share of the
country considerably exceeds the trade share of the country. China and
United Arab Emirates (UAE) are examples of countries where India has
substantial trade but that are not sources of FDI to India.
13.6.2 Portfolio Flows
Indian Securities in a Global Portfolio
In the portfolio optimization of a globally diversiﬁed investor, the ap-
peal of Indian securities is related to their lack of correlation with global
risk factors. Some correlations of weekly returns, in the period from Octo-
ber 1995 to February 2004, are in table 10.12
In many small countries, liberalization eﬀorts in terms of a more open
current account, FDI, and portfolio ﬂows have led to increased correla-
tions, which has served to diminish the beneﬁts from diversiﬁcation. In or-
628 Ajay Shah and Ila Patnaik
Table 13.9 Country composition of Indian trade and FDI
Country Share in FDI Share in trade
United States 18.8 9.6
Japan 8.1 3.0
The Netherlands 7.7 1.0
United Kingdom 7.3 3.8
Germany 5.6 3.2
Note: FDI share computed over 1991–2004, trade shares over 1998–2004.
11. These fractions have been computed using the following adjustment. The largest coun-
try that sends FDI to India, in the data, is the island of Mauritius (34.5 percent). India has an
advantageous tax treaty with Mauritius, and many investors choose to incorporate in Mauri-
tius in order to beneﬁt from this tax treatment. The values given here show the fraction of
countries in the non-Mauritius FDI into India, and are only accurate insofar as the country
composition of FDI into India that is routed through Mauritius is the same as the country
composition of FDI that comes directly to India.
12. October 1995 is used as the starting point for this data set, since it reﬂects the point by
which the early sharp increase in foreign portfolio ﬂows had been completed, and some ma-
jor changes in the domestic equity market design had been completed. Hence, the period from
October 1995 onward represents a comparable period.der to explore this issue, table 13.10 also breaks the overall period into two
halves. The correlation of the overall index (Cospi) against the Standard
and Poor’s (S&P) 500 doubled from 0.1 in the ﬁrst half to 0.21 in the sec-
ond half. However, 0.21 remains a small number by world standards. For
example, it is lower than the correlation of Korea’s Kospi against the S&P
500 in the ﬁrst half. It is also signiﬁcantly lower than the Korean correla-
tion of 0.396 in the second half.
These low correlations suggest that Indian equities can play a useful role
in improving the Sharpe’s ratio of globally diversiﬁed portfolios. As an il-
lustrative example, applying a portfolio optimizer to the historical covari-
ance matrix over this period yields weights of 61.6 percent for the S&P 500,
11.5 percent for the Korean Kospi, and the remainder in India (19.1 per-
cent in Nifty and 7.8 percent in Cospi). This aspect constitutes one feature
of understanding India’s large equity portfolio inﬂows.
Factors Inﬂuencing Home Bias
In a rational world, decisions about including securities from a given
country in global portfolios should be based on the improvements in di-
versiﬁcation obtained therein. At the same time, a strong problem that is
well known in the literature is that of the home bias, whereby individual
and institutional portfolios tend to hold higher weights of local-country se-
curities. In the literature, home bias is believed to be related to informa-
tional asymmetries and transaction costs. For example, Portes and Rey
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Table 13.10 Correlation matrix of some stock market indexes
Nifty Jr. Kospi Nifty S&P 500
A. Full period
Cospi 0.862 0.254 0.911 0.159
Nifty Jr. 0.233 0.776 0.099
Kospi 0.280 0.312
Nifty 0.221
B. First half of period: October 1995–December 1999
Cospi 0.868 0.105 0.935 0.101
Nifty Jr. 0.101 0.803 0.023
Kospi 0.155 0.237
Nifty 0.169
C. Second half of period: December 1999–February 2004
Cospi 0.863 0.424 0.892 0.209
Nifty Jr. 0.377 0.760 0.142
Kospi 0.441 0.396
Nifty 0.272
Notes: This table uses weekly returns data from October 1995 to February 2004. Nifty is the
Indian stock market index of the top ﬁfty stocks. Nifty Jr. is the second rung of ﬁfty stocks.
Cospi is the Indian index encompassing all active stocks, which number around 2,000. Kospi
is the Korean stock market index.(2001) ﬁnd that the geography of information—rather than the quest for
eﬃcient portfolios through diversiﬁcation—dominates patterns of cross-
border equity ﬂows. Other constraints include size, liquidity, and corporate
governance.
India’s success at attracting substantial portfolio ﬂows relates to
strengths on these issues of information, size, and liquidity.
Size: India is a large economy, with a strong set of domestic ﬁrms in
place by the 1990s when portfolio ﬂows commenced. A steady ﬂow of start-
ups and IPOs has fueled a large domestic corporate sector. As of February
2006, the market capitalization of the equity market was $600 billion.
Information: On the issues of informational asymmetries and transac-
tion costs, India had strengths in terms of a century-old tradition of law,
accounting, and stock market trading with extensive participation by do-
mestic households. This implied that many issues about law, information
disclosure, and corporate governance, which were important to foreign in-
vestors, were broadly in place in India before portfolio ﬂows commenced.
India’s extensive use of English, and the extensive presence of individuals
of Indian origin in global ﬁnance companies, has helped reduce the infor-
mational asymmetry faced by foreign investors. Familiarity with India
among global ﬁnance companies was further heightened from the late
1990s onward, when most major global ﬁnance companies started moving
parts of their production process to India, including areas such as call cen-
ters, accounting, back oﬃce processing, research, and software develop-
ment.
Liquidity: While the extensive participation by domestic households
oﬀered the possibility of a liquid and active stock market, in the early 1990s
there were many weaknesses in the market design, which led to high trans-
action costs. As a response to these weaknesses, many domestic ﬁrms chose
to disintermediate the domestic securities markets and engage in oﬀshore
issuance through ADR or GDR markets. This allowed these ﬁrms to ex-
ploit the superior market design that was available outside in London or
New York. However, securities issued outside the country did suﬀer from
poor liquidity owing to the incompatible time zone and lack of widespread
trading interest.
Partly as a response to the diﬃculties faced by foreign investors on do-
mestic stock markets, India embarked on a major program of modifying
incentives and institutions on the securities markets (Shah and Thomas
2000; Thomas 2006). This involved a new securities regulator (SEBI) and a
new set of securities trading institutions (NSE, NSCC, and NSDL). These
institutions innovated on the market design, introducing all the elements
of world-class securities infrastructure: demutualization of the exchange
(1993), electronic limit order book market (1994), elimination of entry bar-
riers into intermediation (1994), nationwide access (1994), novation at the
clearing corporation (1996), dematerialized settlement (1996), equity de-
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(2001, 2002).
This reform program had a profound impact upon transaction costs
(Shah and Thomas 1997). It helped foster IPOs, the growth of market cap-
italization, and foreign investment. It also eliminated the rationale for
oﬀshore issuance as a mechanism to disintermediate an ineﬃcient domes-
tic market.
In the process of institution building on the securities markets, India
harnessed the scale economies associated with a large number of listed
companies and a large number of active speculators. The two stock mar-
kets in India—NSE and BSE—are ranked third and ﬁfth in the world by
number of transactions. These economies of scale in India were a sharp
contrast with the diﬃculties faced by many small countries in building liq-
uid securities markets (Shah and Thomas 2003).13
Growth of Net Portfolio Flows
Figure 13.6shows the time series of quarterly portfolio ﬂows. In order to
aid comparability, it has the same scale as ﬁgures 13.1 and 13.5. India’s
share of world portfolio ﬂows considerably exceeds India’s share in world
FDI ﬂows.
FIIs and the Domestic Equity Market
India is a retail-dominated equity market, where institutional investors
account for roughly 10.8 percent of spot market turnover and just 3.3 per-
cent of derivatives turnover. The easing of capital controls for foreign port-
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13. The bond market experienced a very diﬀerent trajectory in the domestic reform process,
and largely failed to achieve comparable results in terms of liquidity and transparency. How-
ever, the prevailing policy environment aimed to discourage debt-related ﬂows. Hence, the
weakness of the bond market was not a binding constraint in shaping portfolio ﬂows.
Fig. 13.6 Net portfolio ﬂows (US$ billions per quarter)folio investors has led to extensive trading by foreign portfolio investors.
Putting the spot and derivatives markets together, in 2004, FIIs purchased
Rs2,699 billion and sold Rs2,328 billion (table 13.11). From 2001 to 2004,
the number of registered FIIs rose from 490 to 637, and the number of sub-
accounts rose from 1,372 to 1,785, showing a greater diversity of the for-
eign investors present.
Derivatives transactions by FIIs were not separately tracked prior to
2004. The inclusion of derivatives data from 2004 onward overstates the in-
crease in FII turnover for 2004, which hence shows a sharp jump from
Rs1,583 billion in 2003 to Rs5,027 billion in 2004. While Rs5,027 billion of
gross FII turnover—summing across spot and derivatives markets—ap-
pears to be a large number, it now makes up only 5.83 percent of the over-
all Indian equity market (table 13.12).14
13.6.3 Determinants of Portfolio Flows
Given the prominence of portfolio ﬂows into India, it is important to un-
derstand the factors that shape portfolio ﬂows.15 In the literature on port-
folio ﬂows into emerging markets, evidence has been found about the im-
portance of the U.S. interest rate and ﬂows into equity-oriented fund
managers in the United States. If foreign fund managers react to informa-
tion in India with a lag, then lagged output and lagged stock returns should
help predict portfolio inﬂows. If decisions of foreign fund managers are
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Table 13.11 Foreign institutional investors (FIIs) on the equity market (in billions
of rupees)
2001 2002 2003 2004
End-year number of FIIs 490 502 540 637
End-year number of subaccounts 1,372 1,361 1,542 1,785
Spot market activity
Gross buy 518 288 944 1,857
Gross sell 386 253 640 1,467
Net 131 35 305 390
Derivatives activity
Gross buy n.a. n.a. n.a. 842
Gross sell n.a. n.a. n.a. 861
Net n.a. n.a. n.a. –19
Source: Ministry of Finance (2006).
Note: n.a.   not available.
14. A key feature of measurement in table 13.12 is the use of “gross turnover.” Trading vol-
ume data, as normally reported by exchanges, shows volume of Rs100 when one security
worth Rs100 goes from a seller to a buyer. However, when data are captured about the gross
trading of market participants, this transaction shows up twice, as Rs200 of trades. To ensure
comparability, the table reexpresses all data as gross turnover, by doubling the trading volume
as reported by exchanges.
15. This question has been recently addressed by Gordon and Gupta (2003).shaped by expectations about the currency, then the CIP deviation should
help predict portfolio inﬂows.16
Portfolio ﬂows into government bonds are highly restricted by India’s
capital controls. Hence, we focus on portfolio ﬂows into the equity market.
Table 13.13shows two OLS regressions that explain portfolio ﬂows into the
equity market. The time span available is short, from March 1998 until
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Table 13.12 Gross turnover (in billions of rupees)
2001 2002 2003 2004
Spot market
NSE   BSE gross turnover 23,416 19,142 26,340 34,168
FIIs 904 540 1,583 3,323
Derivatives
NSE   BSE gross turnover 838 6,927 28,804 51,118
FIIs 1,703
Equity spot   derivatives
NSE   BSE gross turnover 24,254 26,070 55,145 86,286
FIIs 904 540 1,583 5,027
Source: Ministry of Finance (2006).
Table 13.13 Explaining portfolio ﬂows into the equity market: Monthly data, March
1998 to October 2004
Parsimonious Kitchen sink
Intercept 238.245 207.209
CIP deviation 106.937 74.679
(5.26) (2.09)
Squared CIP deviation 8.985 4.121
(2.10) (0.76)
U.S. 90-day rate –15.686
(–0.51)
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3
Lagged Nifty returns –0.350 6.960 8.550
(–0.06) (1.18) (1.47)
Lagged industrial growth –8.061 27.042 –4.12
(–0.24) (0.88) (–0.14)
Lagged S&P 500 returns 5.052 9.196 4.961
(0.58) (1.05) (0.53)
R2 0.2668 0.3396
Adjusted R2 0.2477 0.2213
16. As of late 2004, the Indian r fwas 4.5 percent, the historical equity premium was roughly
8 percent, and the annualized volatility of the equity index was roughly 20 percent. The
Sharpe’s ratio of the equity index—as viewed by a foreign investor—would hence be signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀected by currency views of (say)  5 percent on an annualized basis.Table 13.14 Volatility of capital ﬂows: Summary statistics of quarterly data from 1995:Q1 to
2004:Q2 (in US$ millions)
25th 75th Interquartile 
Minimum percentile Median percentile Maximum range
Raw data
Portfolio –423 260 594 899 4,111 624
FDI 365 595 886 1,175 1,768 564
Debt –1,257 270 826 2,330 3,895 1,825
Oﬃcial –2,657 –738 –24 210 857 921
Total –1,514 1,436 2,426 3,969 5,315 2,496
Residuals about time trend
Portfolio –1,278 –531 –19 311 2,903 815
FDI –534 –137 –26 115 666 246
Debt –2,448 –826 –230 1,083 2,833 1,806
Oﬃcial –2,249 –555 261 511 1,214 1,017
Total –3,648 –771 224 1,317 2,340 2,018
October 2004. None of the explanatory variables are signiﬁcant in the
“kitchen sink” model, other than the CIP deviation. The parsimonious
model is a quadratic in the CIP deviation, where bigger ﬂows come into the
equity market when the currency is expected to appreciate, with a nonlin-
earity in response where bigger deviations induce bigger inﬂows.
These results suggest that in India’s short experience, traditional ex-
planatory variables appear to be relatively less important, and currency ex-
pectations do play a role in shaping portfolio ﬂows into the equity market.
13.6.4 Volatility of Capital Flows
India’s stance on liberalization of the capital account was strongly mo-
tivated by certain priors about the volatility of capital ﬂows, and about the
extent to which diﬀerent kinds of capital ﬂows would impinge upon imple-
mentation of the prevailing currency regime. In the literature, there has
been disagreement about the volatility of the various kinds of capital ﬂows,
and the interplay between the currency regime adopted and the volatility
of certain kinds of capital ﬂows.17
We can use quarterly balance-of-payments data in order to review India’s
experience with volatility of the four components of capital ﬂows. In order to
avoid the formative period where large changes were taking place in response
to the ﬁrst easing of capital controls, we focus on the period after 1995. This
helps us obtain information about the behavior in the postreform period.
Table 13.14 shows summary statistics about the four components of net
634 Ajay Shah and Ila Patnaik
17. Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2004) ﬁnd that in Asia, in the decade of the
1990s, the volatility of capital ﬂows was 1.2 for FDI, 15.4 for portfolio equity ﬂows, and 1.6
for debt. They deﬁne volatility of capital ﬂows as the standard deviation of per capita net cap-
ital ﬂow divided by the average of gross inﬂow and gross outﬂow.capital ﬂows, using data for thirty-seven quarters from 1995:Q1 to
2004:Q2. Since the data often have unusual distributional characteristics,
the interquartile range is used as a relatively nonparametric measure of
dispersion.18
The raw data show that a net outﬂow was never observed in the case of
FDI. FDI and portfolio ﬂows have similar values for the interquartile
range. Debt and oﬃcial ﬂows seem to be much more volatile than FDI and
portfolio ﬂows.
When expressed as residuals about a time trend, all four components
have experienced signiﬁcant negative outﬂows in the worst quarter. Viewed
in this fashion, FDI ﬂows seem to be highly stable, and more stable than
other components. The ranking of volatility of components, when viewed
in this fashion, appears to be debt   oﬃcial   portfolio   FDI.
Over this period, ﬂuctuations in debt and oﬃcial ﬂows frequently re-
ﬂected changes in the policy framework. Capital controls and other policy
levers were frequently used to encourage or discourage debt and oﬃcial
ﬂows, depending on the tactical exigencies of implementing the currency
peg. On some occasions, oﬀshore borrowing was eﬀectively initiated by the
government, and banks were encouraged to borrow abroad at high rates
(set by the RBI). At other times, strict controls have been placed on oﬀ-
shore borrowing, and the interest rate at which banks borrow has been
cut (Gordon and Gupta 2004). Hence, there is need for caution in inter-
preting the characteristics seen therein, which may reﬂect factors such as
policy volatility and currency expectations. The volatility of debt ﬂows and
of oﬃcial ﬂows might have been very diﬀerent if India’s policies on capital
controls had been stable, or if the currency regime had been diﬀerent.
The results for the volatility of India’s portfolio and FDI ﬂows reﬂect the
characteristics of these ﬂows and of the Indian economy, since they reﬂect
the outcomes obtained under a broadly stable policy framework, subject to
a steady process of liberalization whereby controls have been slowly re-
laxed over the years, with an essentially one-way direction of reforms.
13.6.5 Evaluating India’s Experience with 
the Composition of Capital Flows
India represents an unusual situation of a developing country where
portfolio ﬂows have been particularly important. Net portfolio ﬂows are
presently roughly three times the size of net FDI ﬂows. India’s experience
is hence an opportunity to illuminate our understanding of the composi-
tion of capital ﬂows.
Where many economists have argued in favor of FDI given that FDI is
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18. The prob values obtained using the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality for the ﬁve time se-
ries are as follows: portfolio (4.672   10–6), FDI (0.081), debt (0.035), oﬃcial (0.0018), and
total (0.57). Hence, we avoid the use of the standard deviations as a measure of dispersion.“bolted down” and cannot ﬂee in the event of a crisis, recent research
has brought new perspectives to bear on this question. Hausmann and
Fernandez-Arias (2000) ﬁnd that when countries develop, while total capi-
tal ﬂows go up, the share of FDI in capital ﬂows goes down. They argue that
portfolio ﬂows require more sophisticated institutions and a greater degree
of trust on the part of the investor. Their analysis suggests that a domina-
tion of FDI is found in countries with the weakest institutions. In addition,
Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann (2000) argue that FDI is not necessarily
“bolted down”: a ﬁrm faced with a currency crisis can ﬁnd many instru-
mentalities to take capital out, such as borrowing in the country against
physical assets as collateral, and taking ﬁnancial capital out of the country.
In this context, Bird and Rajan (2002) oﬀer striking evidence from
Malaysia. In the period from 1990 to 1997, Malaysia had no portfolio in-
ﬂows, and FDI dominated their capital inﬂows. Yet Malaysia went on to
experience a currency crisis.
The Indian experience is interesting from the viewpoint of this debate.
India represents a large country where sophisticated institutions have
helped obtain high success in attracting portfolio ﬂows.
13.7 Impossible Trinity
As highlighted in table 13.1 early in this paper, the size of the current ac-
count and the capital account rose sharply from 1992–93 to 2003–4. Gross
ﬂows on the current account, expressed in U.S. dollars, grew at a com-
pound rate of 12.77 percent per annum, and gross ﬂows on the capital ac-
count grew at a similar rate of 11.97 percent per annum. Both these growth
rates were faster than the growth of GDP expressed in nominal U.S. dol-
lars of 9.36 percent per annum. Hence, the overall measure of integration
(gross ﬂows on capital account and current account, expressed as percent
of GDP) rose sharply from 40.4 percent of GDP in 1992–93 to 55 percent
in 2003–4.
Under these conditions, considerable movements of capital can take
place in response to speculative views about the currency. As an example,
the regression results of table 13.13 show that speculative views reﬂected in
covered interest parity (CIP) deviations are an important explanatory
variable in the model seeking to explain portfolio ﬂows.
The period 2003–4 serves as a valuable illustration of how capital ﬂows
would behave under conditions where the currency regime induced a cur-
rency spot price process that gave private agents signiﬁcant opportunities
for speculative trading on the currency. When economic agents have views
about future currency movements, all avenues are utilized for currency
speculation. It is well known in the literature on capital controls that the
current account can be used for implementing capital movements and
currency speculation, through overinvoicing, underinvoicing, prepayment,
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become more pertinent, given the sharp rise in the size of the current ac-
count, from 25 percent of GDP in 1992–93 to 35 percent in 2003–4. FDI
and portfolio ﬂows are fairly open. Even with the constraints that are in
place in India on debt ﬂows, it is striking to notice that in 2003–4, debt
ﬂows worked out to roughly $6 billion out of total net capital ﬂows of $20
billion.
These arguments suggest that the impossible trinity is an increasingly
important constraint faced by Indian macro policy (Joshi 2003). Patnaik
(2005) examines how monetary policy was attenuated through implemen-
tation of the currency regime in two prominent episodes in the recent
eleven-year period. The pressures in implementing the pegged exchange
rate were heightened in 2003 and 2004, and while no public announcement
has been made about a change in the currency regime, nominal rupee-
dollar volatility rose signiﬁcantly from 0.129 percent per day in some
months to 0.355 percent per day in other months.
India continues to grapple with the trade-oﬀs associated with the im-
possible trinity. On January 12, 2005, the head of the central bank pro-
posed that India should reexamine the existing framework of capital con-
trols and possibly introduce a fresh set of restrictions including quotas or
ceilings on portfolio ﬂows, enhancing “quality of ﬂows” by restrictions
upon eligible foreign investors, price-based measures such as taxes, and
monitoring and restrictions upon voting rights of nonresidents. While no
decisions were taken to introduce such capital controls, the speech high-
lights the tensions faced in Indian macro policy and the diﬃculties faced in
the existing combination of a pegged exchange rate and a fairly open cap-
ital account.
As argued in section 13.3, a major feature of India’s recent experience
with capital ﬂows has been the outward ﬂows of capital taking place since
the RBI’s purchase of reserves exceeded net capital inﬂows. The recent ex-
perience with the stock of reserves and the ﬂow of net purchases by the RBI
on the currency market is shown in ﬁgures 13.7 and 13.8.
This shows a striking buildup of reserves, from roughly $40 billion to
$115 billion, over the period from late 2001 to early 2004. Through this pe-
riod, RBI purchases on the currency market went up to $7 billion in April
2004. Patnaik (2003) argues that this reserve buildup was related to imple-
menting the currency regime. Through this period, India experienced cur-
rent account surpluses. This was a paradoxical turnaround compared with
the starting point of the reforms. A goal of the early reforms was to ﬁnd a
sustainable mechanism to sustain the import of capital (i.e., a current ac-
count deﬁcit). In 2002, India found itself in a situation with persistent ex-
port of capital.
The currency regime has continued to evolve in response to the tensions
between capital ﬂows and the pegged exchange rate. In 2003, reserves grew
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rate, gave a one-way bet to private agents. This led to a change in the cur-
rency regime in March 2004. Table 13.15shows the small daily ﬂuctuations
of the rupee-dollar rate going up to March 19, 2004, and the larger volatil-
ity from that date on. The ﬁrst nine days shown in this table had a zero
change in the exchange rate; the second nine days shown had an apprecia-
tion of 3.4 percent. In the period from January 1, 2000, to March 19, 2004,
daily rupee-dollar returns had a volatility of 0.129 percent. For some of the
following months (March 22, 2004, to February 11, 2005), the volatility
had nearly tripled, to 0.355.
Such sharp changes in the time series process of the rupee-dollar spot
price reﬂect the pressures of implementation of the pegged exchange rate
in an increasingly open economy. Across these events, however, no changes
in the currency regime were oﬃcially announced. The private sector sud-
denly saw an unexpected and sharp change in currency volatility.
Even in months when little trading was done by the RBI, reserves con-
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Fig. 13.7 Foreign currency reserves
Fig. 13.8 RBI purchases on the currency markettinued to ﬂuctuate owing to the currency composition of the portfolio, and
returns are earned on the ﬁxed income instruments in which reserves are
invested.19In addition, the period after May 2004 was one in which the U.S.
dollar depreciated signiﬁcantly against the euro. Since India held signiﬁ-
cant euro-denominated assets but reported foreign currency reserves in
dollars, this showed up as higher reserves.
13.7.1 Lack of Sustained Current Account Deﬁcit
As emphasized in section 13.2, India has long sought to augment do-
mestic savings using capital ﬂows so as to achieve a higher investment rate.
As argued above, the currency regime chosen by India led to a failure to
achieve this goal, despite considerable success in attracting sustained cap-
ital ﬂows.
Table 13.16shows how from 1995–96 to 2003–4 India lost 3.4 percent of
GDP of an investment rate owing to the change in the current account bal-
ance. In the table, the savings rate rose strongly by 3.0 percentage points of
GDP over an eight-year period, but the investment rate actually dropped
by 0.6 percentage points of GDP.
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Table 13.15 The rupee-dollar exchange rate, March 9 to April 5, 2004
Date Rate Returns (%)
March 9 45.21 –0.09
March 10 45.23 0.04
March 11 45.25 0.04
March 12 45.27 0.04
March 15 45.25 –0.04
March 16 45.24 –0.02
March 17 45.25 0.02
March 18 45.22 –0.07
March 19 45.22 0.00
March 22 45.15 –0.15
March 23 44.93 –0.49
March 24 44.76 –0.38
March 25 44.75 –0.02
March 26 44.73 –0.04
March 29 44.12 –1.37
March 31 43.39 –1.67
April 2 43.77 0.87
April 5 43.67 –0.23
19. India does not disclose the currency composition of the reserve portfolio. On April 30,
2004, disclosures under the IMF Template on International Reserves showed that of the re-
serve portfolio of $113 billion, $40 billion were held as securities, and $72.9 billion were held
as “currency and deposits.” Of the securities portfolio, the U.S. Treasury disclosure system
(Sobol 1998) (http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt) showed that in December 2004, India had
$12.9 billion of U.S. government bonds.13.8 Conclusion
India serves as an interesting case study in integration into the world
economy. The initial conditions involved a small trade-GDP ratio and a
highly repressed capital account. At the same time, India had many po-
tential strengths for participating in ﬁnancial globalization. These in-
cluded strong traditions of law and accounting, a long tradition of equity
ownership and price discovery on speculative markets, and an absence of a
history of default.20
The goals of the reforms of the early 1990s were articulated by the pol-
icy makers of the time as comprising three elements:
1. Avoiding debt ﬂows, particularly short-term debt ﬂows, which were
viewed as being potentially destabilizing.
2. Increasing India’s trade integration into the world.
3. Spurring Indian growth by harnessing the growing global FDI and
portfolio ﬂows.
In the postwar period, two successful “Asian development models” are
known. The ﬁrst is the approach of a completely closed capital account,
with no FDI and no portfolio ﬂows, which was followed by Japan (1950s–
1960s) and Korea and Taiwan (1970s–1980s). There is the alternative ap-
proach of encouraging FDI and having restricted portfolio ﬂows, followed
by Singapore (1970s–1980s), Malaysia and Thailand (1980s–1990s), and
China (1980s). Both these models used substantial rigidity in the currency
regime. India appears to have embarked on a diﬀerent path, with consid-
erable freedom for both FDI and portfolio ﬂows, modern institutional de-
velopment of securities markets, considerable success in attracting port-
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Table 13.16 Saving, investment, and current account balance
Year Savings Investment Current account balance
1995–1996 25.1 26.9 –1.7
1996–1997 23.2 24.5 –1.2
1997–1998 23.1 24.6 –1.4
1998–1999 21.5 22.6 –1.0
1999–2000 24.2 25.3 –1.0
2000–2001 23.7 24.4 –0.6
2001–2002 23.4 22.6 0.7
2002–2003 26.1 24.8 1.2
2003–2004 28.1 26.3 1.7
20. As emphasized in Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004), some countries are “serial defaulters”
and pose high risks to foreign sources of capital. India has been through two IMF programs
in situations where a ﬁxed exchange rate regime was challenged owing to near exhaustion of
reserves (in 1981 and 1991). However, India has never defaulted.folio ﬂows, and a pegged exchange rate regime with greater currency ﬂexi-
bility as compared with some Asian peers.
India did not engage in “big bang” liberalization. The full policy impli-
cations of this broad position were worked out through a steady pace of
numerous reforms initiatives in the 1992–2004 period. The 2004 frame-
work of tariﬀs, restrictions against FDI, and restrictions against portfolio
ﬂows implies that the reform agenda on the current account, on FDI, and
on portfolio ﬂows remained incomplete as of 2004.
Looking back, some of the goals have been achieved to a signiﬁcant ex-
tent:
1. Net debt ﬂows were at roughly 1 percent of GDP in both 1992–93 and
2003–4. Gross debt ﬂows actually dropped sharply, from 13.5 percent of
GDP in 1992–93 to 10.6 percent in 2003–4.
2. Trade integration has gone up sharply, with gross current account
ﬂows rising from 25 percent of GDP in 1992–93 to 35 percent in 2003–4.
3. FDI and portfolio ﬂows have gone up sharply. India has fared partic-
ularly well in the institutional transformation of the equity market, which
helped Indian equities obtain acceptance in global portfolios. The experi-
ence with FDI ﬂows, while showing strong growth rates when compared
with the initial conditions, lags behind that of other Asian countries, both
in absolute terms and when expressed as percentage of GDP.
In an open economy, these three aspects of policy are closely intertwined
with the currency regime. India has been in a quest for openness in trade,
FDI, and portfolio ﬂows, while continuing to have capital controls in most
other respects, and trying to have both an independent monetary policy
and a pegged exchange rate. A strong consensus exists in India about the
usefulness of extensive trading by the central bank on the currency market
in implementing currency policy. Indeed, issues about the currency regime
were not debated in the 1992–2002 period.
As a consequence, India’s experience with capital ﬂows is deeply inter-
twined with India’s experience with the currency regime. Capital ﬂows
have shaped the currency regime, and the currency regime has shaped cap-
ital ﬂows.
Openness on the trade account, FDI, and portfolio ﬂows has given eco-
nomic agents opportunities to express speculative views about currency
movements, and thus has thrown up new problems in the implementation
of pegging. India diﬀers from China in the importance of portfolio ﬂows.
Portfolio ﬂows involve robust inﬂows and outﬂows. For example, in 2003–
4, portfolio inﬂows were only 1.67 times bigger than portfolio outﬂows,
and gross portfolio ﬂows amounted to 7 percent of GDP.
Diﬃculties faced by the central bank in implementing the currency
regime have continually inﬂuenced the pace of removal of controls on cap-
ital ﬂows. In particular, there has been signiﬁcant policy volatility with re-
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oﬀshore borrowing to periods with sharp restrictions upon oﬀshore bor-
rowing. Similarly, policies on outward capital ﬂows have been ambivalent
and have lacked the consistent direction of reform that was found on the
current account, on FDI, and on portfolio ﬂows.
The implementation of the currency regime has led to large capital out-
ﬂows. One of the key goals of the reforms of the 1990s was to augment do-
mestic GDP growth by attracting FDI and portfolio ﬂows. In 2003–4, the
total net capital inﬂows of $20.5 billion were accompanied by an outward
oﬃcial capital ﬂow of over $31.4 billion. This leads to concerns about
whether this policy framework has succeeded in serving the interests of
accelerating GDP growth. India has undoubtedly reaped microeconomic
beneﬁts from the new presence of FDI and foreign investors on the equity
market. However, the pegged exchange rate regime has not allowed capital
inﬂows to augment domestic investment on a sustained basis.
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